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INSANITY DEFENSE - MALINGER-
IN.-[Colorado] The defendant
was charged with murder. He had
shot and killed two men without
warning, following a dispute over
some hay on his ranch. He pleaded
not guilty by reason of insanity,
but the jury found him guilty of
murder in the first degree and fixed
his penalty at death. During the
trial two physicians testified for the
people that the defendant was sane
at the time of the homicide. The
director of the State Psychopathic
Hospital expressed the opinion that
not only was the defendant sane at
the time of the homicide, but also
that he was sane when examined,
and that he was only malingering.
Defendant was declared sane by
witnesses who had known him for
from seven to thirteen years. The
defendant's witnesses were all mem-
bers of his family exept one. That
one did not express an opinion as
to the prisoner's sanity, but the
other witnesses testified that his
sister and three of her children
were afflicted with insanity and that
defendant himself was not "right in
his mind." They further testified
that the accused acted insane while
in jail. The testimony of the deputy
sheriff was to the effect that the de-
fendant, while in jail, only acted
insane when he was being watched,
"that he heard the defendant whis-
pering, but not unless others were
NEWMAN F. BAKER, Faculty Adviser
around and the defendant thought
they were looking; that the defend-
ant got so he would not pay any
attention to the witness, but if any-
body came in with the witness, the
defendant 'would put on a show' for
them; that is to say, he would throw
all sorts -of things, would grab a
quilt and put it over his head, 'or
something like that.' The witness
also testified that on one occasion,
when some plumbers left late at
night after working at the jail, the
witness turned out the light and
slammed the door and then watched
the defendant through a hole that
the plumbers had made in the wall
in the course of their work; that
the defendant had been dancing
around all afternoon with a quilt
over his shoulders, and had bedding
scattered all around; that after the
witness slammed the door the de-
fendant stood listening and when
he could not hear anything and
thought everybody was gone, his ap-
pearance and actions changed; that
he quit 'acting up,' took the quilt
off and laid it on the opposite bunk,
shook the dust out of his bedding,
folded it up, and 'made his bed like
anybody would."' Held: judgment
affirmed, on the theory that the de-
fendant was merely feigning insan-
ity: Farmer v. People (Colorado,
1932), 7 P. (2d) 947.
Simulation of insanity presents
one of the oldest and most important
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extra-legal questions existent in
criminal law. That it is no new
subterfuge is attested by the fact
that over two thousand years ago
Lycophron (285-247 B. C.), a Greek
savant of the time of Ptolemy
Philadelphus, spoke of the feigned
madness of Ulysses, assumed by him
in an effort to avoid military ser-
vice: Goodwin, "Insanity and the
Criminal," p. 88. There were other
celebrated individuals of ancient
days who also simulated insanity
during times of stress or danger.
King David, Brutus, the expeller of
the Tarquin, and Solon the Atheni-
an may be cited: Jones and Llewel-
lyn, "Malingering," p. 286. Of late
years, following the great develop-
ment of the insanity defense in
murder trials, the question of
malingering has been squarely pre-
sented to American courts. The de-
fense of insanity has proved very
effective in freeing murderers, and
consequently it has been used more
than any other defense. Attorneys
have introduced the plea merely as
legal strategy knowing at the time
that it was not justified and that
there was not the slightest possi-
bility of their clients being mentally
diseased: Current History, August,
1930, p. 943. "The guilty have es-
caped not only from conviction but
from confinement in humanely man-
aged asylums": Bojes, "The Science
of Penology," p. 214. "Monstrous
verdicts of 'not guilty' have followed
so frequently as at last to arouse
general indignation": Kavanagh,
"The Criminal and His Allies," p.
90.
A short review of a few of the
most celebrated malingering cases
of the last decade or two will tend
to show the extended use made of
feigned insanity in order to procure
the acquittal of guilty defendants.
The case of, George Remus is a re-
cent example of the modem use of
the insanity defense where malinger-
ing was obviously present. Remus
murdered his wife in 'cold-blood,
pleaded insanity, and after a long-
drawn out legal battle, during which
he feigned insanity, he was eventu-
ally committed to a hospital for the
insane and a short while later set
free: In re Remus (1928) 119 Ohio
St. 166, 162 N. E. 740. The widely-
known case of Russell Scott also
exhibited unmistakeable evidence of
malingering in insanity, but the de-
fendant's own suicide prevented the
success of his plea: People v. Scott
(1927) 326 Ill. 327, 157 N. E. 247.
The case of Harry Thaw, and his
escape from the death penalty on
the grounds of alleged insanity, is
too well known to merit descrip-
tion: Mackenzie, "The Thaw Case',"
p. 299. People v. Thaw (1915)
154 N. Y. S. 949. In addition
a mention may bq made of the
Robin, Graham, and Lincoln cases
in which pleas of feigned insanity
met with varied degrees of success:
Outlook and Independent, February
6, 1929, p. 205. See also: People
v. Schmidt (1915) 216 N. Y. 324,
110 N. E. 945; People v. Krauser
(1925) 315 Ill. 485, 146 N. E. 593;
People v. Costello (1926) 320 Ill.
79, 150 N. E. 712.
In order to prevent such decep-
tion various tests have been devised
in an effort to determine the ques-
tion of alleged mental unsoundness
in criminal cases. Goodwin lists
six such tests in his "Insanity and
the Criminal," p. 95.
(1) What is a possible cause
of the defendant's insanity?
(Heredity, physical injury, worry,
etc.)
(2) The insane exhibit a pe-
culiar eye expression which a ma-
lingerer cannot indefinitely simu-
late. In the presence of the sus-
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pect, imply that he is a malinger-
er. Then watch to see if his
eye expression betrays an appreci-
ation of the situation.
(3) What is the condition of
the prisoner's memory as to
events unrelated to the crime?
(4) A true lunatic, especially a
maniac, rarely sleeps soundly.
The malingerer, often exhausted
by the effort of malingering, is a
sound sleeper.
(5) An imposter may threaten
suicide. The genuine suicide-to-
be rarely proclaims his intention
in advance.
(6) Certain bodily responses
accompany the forms of true in-
sanity. Physical tests, such as
ascertaining blood-pressure, pulse,
condition of the tongue, behavior
of the pupil of the eye, etc., can
be made by medical men as an aid
in discovering a malingerer.
Other suggested tests are:
(7) An insane person will not
admit that he is mad. Does the
suspect vigorously assert his in-
sanity, as is the usual case with
malingerers?: Collie, "Malinger-
ing," p. 423.
(8) Letters written by the in-
sane can rarely be imitated. Each
type of insanity produces its spe-
cial variety of letter. Peruse a
recent letter written by the sus-
pect, or request him to write one:
Ibid, p. 425.
(9) A malingerer, suddenly
awakened from sleep, may answer
a question or two intelligently be-
fore he realizes his error: (1928)
24 The Medico-Legal Journal, 78.
(10) Insanity often develops so
slowly and insidiously as to be
almost unobserved by relatives
and friends. Does the suspect
suddenly begin acting insane
after his arrest, seemingly with-
out sufficient cause?:
Williants, "Crime,




In the instant case it is unfor-
tunate that the court does not dis-
cuss the reasons the physicians gave
to support their opinion that the
defendant was sane. By the state-
ment that "there is no necessity for
repeating" the reasons we do not
know whether scientific tests were
used in a solution of this case. Or,
if used, the number and quality of
them is in doubt. The court does
not mention a single test that might
have aided it in affirming the judg-
ment.
A solution of the subject of
malingering has been attempted by
various states. Legislation has been
passed relating to the insanity of
the defendant after his indictment
but before trial. The state most
progressive in this respect is Mas-
sachusetts. In 1921 that state passed
a law "making it mandatory to re-
port to the department of mental
diseases for examination any per-
son indicted by a grand jury for a
capital crime or who has previously
been convicted of a felony or known
to have been indicted for any of-
fense more than once. Under this
law the examination is compulsory,
is made by impartial psychiatrists
from the State department of men-
tal diseases as a matter of routine
before trial, or any other action is
taken. Thus an unbiased report by
competent medical experts is se-
cured and made a matter of record
at the very outset of the proceed-
ing. In practice this has resulted
in saving long and costly trials as
the findings have usually been ac-
cepted by the prosecuting attorney,
the defendant's counsel and the
court as a satisfactory basis for dis-
posing of a case without trial": The
Survey, May, 1925, pp. 218-219.
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Acts of Mass., 1921, c. 415, as
amended by Acts, 1923, c. 331; Acts,
1925, c. 169; Acts, 1927, c. 59; Acts,
1929, c. 105.
The Massachusetts legislation has
met with marked success and has
been widely approved. A study
wa made of 113 Massachusetts
cases which arose after the law
was enacted. Of the 113, only 7
"were diagnosed by the psychiatrists
as having 'psychopathic personal-
ity' or 'constitutional psychopathic
inferiority.' ". Previously 'there
had been a feeling that if medi-
cine supplanted the law in this
field, there would be a tendency
to find all criminals irresponsible
even in borderline cases. This
study definitely expelled such a feel-
ing: McCarty "Mental Defectives
and the Criminal Law" (1929) 14
Iowa Law Rev. 401.
Colorado has 'passed legislation
which is second only in importance
to that enacted by Massachusetts:
Session Laws of Colorado, 1927, c.
90. This legislation also attempts
to place the insanity question in the
hands of impartial scientists, but it
approaches the problem in a dif-
ferent manner from that of Massa-
chusetts. In Colorado, if the plea
of insanity is raised, the defendant
is committed to a State hospital for
observation as was done in the case
at point. A commission of one or
more physicians, specialists in men-
tal diseases, may also be appointed
to examine the prisoner. This lat-
ter provision is not mandatory in
the Colorado statute but is left in
the hands of the trial judge, a non-
medical person who must take the
initiative. There is no evidence in
the instant case that the judge in
the exercise of his sound discretion
appointed such a commission under
his statutory power. The only
proof that defendant was a malin-
gerer was given in the usual way by
testimony on behalf of the state.
There was no report by an unbiased
medical commission. The result
reached was undoubtedly sound, but
it clearly reveals the weakness of
the Colorado statute in contrast to
the Massachusetts one in not re-
quiring a compulsory and impartial
examination of a defendant plead-
ing insanity instead of only a com-
pulsory commitment to a State hos-
pital. The requirement of com-
pulsory examination as well as com-
mitment as practiced in Massachu-
setts adequately illustrates the su-
periority of the Massachusetts stat-
ute as a model statute. See as to
other state statutes on the subject:
Glueck "Mental Disorder and the
Criminal Law," p. 53 ff. and pp.
499-643.
Another solution of the problem
was attempted when former Chief
Justice Harry Olson of the Munici-
pal Court of Chicago established a
psychiatric laboratory designed to
operate in connection with his court.
He was one of the first to stress
the practical importance of a better
medical knowledge of prisoners. A
few other laboratories were also
established at the criminal courts,
and they showed inherent merit.
During the first ten years examina-
tions and tests were made of over
40,000 cases in the criminal courts:
14 Iowa Law Rev. 408.
JOHN KNOX.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION-
SUFFICIENCY [Oklahoma]. The de-
fendant was charged by information
with the crime of larceny of "do-
mestic fowls," no designation be-
ing made as to the kind of fowl.
The statute under which the de-
fendant was charged makes it a
felony to steal "domestic fowls," but
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does not provide that any further
designation be made as to the kind
of fowl stolen: Okla. Comp. St.
1921 Sec. 2119. A demurrer was
filed to the information and it was
overruled. The defendant excepted,
and on appeal the case was reversed
and remanded with directions to
sustain the demurrer for the rea-
sons that the information did not
state sufficient facts to advise the
accused of the charge against him,
and that it could not be ascertained
from the allegations what class of
domestic fowl or fowls the state
was seeking to convict him of steal-
ing: Hemphill v. State (Okla. Cr.
App. 1931) 6 Pac. (2nd) 450.
It has been held that where there
is a statute concerning the particu-
lar offense, it is sufficient and even
advisable to describe the stolen
property in the words of the statute:
Sloan v. State (1873) 42 Ind. 570;
Long v. State (1888) 23 Neb. 33;
State v. Wilson (1912) 63 Ore. 344,
127 Pac. 980. But it has been said
that where the definition of an of-
fense, whether it be at common law
or by statute, includes generic terms,
it is not sufficient that the indict-
ment charge the offense in the same
generic terms as in the definition,
but it must state the species and the
particulars: United States v. Crui-
shank (1875) 92 U. S. 542; Coin-
mnonwealth v. Chase (1878) 125
Mass. 202. This view seems to be
generally followed by the courts in
this country and apparently was
favored in the instant case. Par-
ticularity and certainty in indict-
ments and informations have been
stressed by the courts in their over-
anxiety to protect the accused's
rights so that he'may be given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to pre-
pare his defense: United States v.
Hess (1887) 124 U. S. 483, 8 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 571; People v. Bricker
(1920) 212 Mich. 137, 180 N. W.
383.
It may be observed that a few
courts have not chosen to follow
this seemingly well-established rule,
and have held, particularly in cat-
tle-stealing %cases, that a general
description in generic terms of the
property stolen is sufficient: People
v. Littlefield (1855) 5 Cal. 355;
State v. Dewitt (1899) 152 Mo. 84,
53 S. W. 429; Matthews v. State
(1899) 41 Tex. Cr. Rep. 98, 51 S.
W. 915; State ex rel. Esser v. Dis-
trict Court (1918) 42 Nev. 218, 174
Pac. 1023; Perkins v. State (1931)
182 Ark. 1167, 34 S. W. (2d) 746.
Under this view it seems that the
instant case could have been decided
differently with but little pressure
on the conscience of the court. The
Oklahoma statute reads as follows:
"The indictment or information
must contain a statement of the
acts constituting the offense, in or-
dinary and concise language, and
in such manner as to enable a per-
son of common understanding to
know what is intended": Okla.
Comp. St. 1921 Sec. 2556. The
court applied this statute in arriv-
ing at its decision. May it not
rationally be said that the accused
was sufficiently informed of the of-
fense with which he was charged?
It would seem that the crime was
so described as to be readily under-
stood by "a person of common un-
derstanding." Is not the court back-
ing away from its chief function
of seeing that justice is done by
finding that an indictment, which is
set forth in generic terms and fol-
lows the words of the statute, is in-
sufficient merely because it does not
state particulars? The court could
have adopted a less technical view
and arrived at a more just and ra-
tional result. Courts recently have
been favoring a more liberal inter-
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pretation of indictments which are
framed in the words of the statute;
and apparently the tendency is away




FORE THE FAcr.-[Kentucky] De-
fendant was indicted for having
aided and abetted in the killing of
deceased, Sam Wright. The defend-
ant, his wife, and Melvin Branham,
the deceased principal in the crime,
were members of a family divided
into two quarreling factions. The
above named persons composed one
faction, and Sam Wright, his wife,
Mahala Wright, and Henry Bran-
ham composed the other. The wife
of the defendant went on the prem-
ises of the Wrights in search of
her dog. When she found it, she
commenced to whip it; her aunt
Mahala Wright then interfered and
the two women started to fight. De-
fendant being informed of this fight
rushed to the scene followed by
Melvin Branham who had a gun.
They were stopped outside the
premises by Sam Wright, the de-
ceased, at the point of a gun. De-
fendant shouted to Melvin Bran,
ham, "Shoot him! God damn him!
Shoot him !" Melvin Branham shot
and killed Sam Wright, and the de-
fendant, was tried and convicted of
being an accessory to the crime of
manslaughter. Held, on appeal:
judgment reversed on the ground
that the lower court should have
granted the defendant's motion and
excluded the witnesses from the
court room before the state opened
its case to the jury. The decision
however laid down the rule that the
mere presence of the defendant,
without more, at the time decedent
was killed by another would not
make the defendant criminally liable
for homicide: Ray v. Common-
wealth (1931) 43 S. W. (2d) 694.
This rule is supported by the
great weight of authority both in
this jurisdiction and other jurisdic-
tions: White v. People (1876) 81
Ill. 333; People v. Fay (1888) 70
Mich. 421, 38 N. W. 296; McCoy v.
State (1898) 40 FIa. 494, 24 So.
485; Walker v. State (1903) 118
Ga. 10, 43 S. E. 856; Tucker v.
Commonwealth (1911) 145 Ky. 84,
140 S. W. 73. The presence of the
defendant at the scene of the homi-
cide is, however, one of the evi-
dentiary circumstances for the con-
sideration of the jury: Burrell v.
State (1857) 18 Tex. 713; State v.
Maloy (1876) 44 Iowa 104; Burn-
ham v. State (1911) 61 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 616, 135 S. W. 1175; People
v. Cione (1920) 293 Ill. 321, 127
N. E. 646.
In order that a defendant be
guilty as an accessory before the
fact to a homicide, he must have
aided, abetted, assisted, or advised
its commission, or must have been
present with that purpose in mind,
to the knowledge of the party actu-
ally committing the crime: Horton
v. Commonwealth (1901) 99 Va.
848, 38 S. E. 184; People v. Mills
(1903) 41 Misc. Rep. 195, 83 N. Y.
Sup. 947; State v. Bailey (1908) 63
W. Va. 668, 60 S. E. 785. See:
Commonwealth v. Kern (1867) 1
Brewst. (Pa.) 350; Bast v. Common-
wealth (1907) 124 Ky. 747, 99 S.
W. 978; Way v. State (1908) 155
Ala. 52, 46 So. 273. Therefore, if
the defendant was present at the
time and place of the crime and
merely acquiesced in its commis-
sion without previous knowledge
that the crime was going to be com-
mitted, he Zannot be held as an ac-
cessory before the fact. So in the
case of Omer v. Commonwealth
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(1894) 95 Ky. 253, 25 S. W. 594,
the court condemned an instruction
by which the jury were in effect told
that, if Oliver was fired upon and
killed by someone other than Omer,
with Omer's knowledge or consent,
the defendant was guilty because
that instruction did not require it to
be Omer's previous knowledge or
consent. Of course Omer knew at
the time the Tring was going on
that it was being done, and the in-
struction was erroneous because it
did not limit this to previous
knowledge of Omer.
However, acquiescence without
previous knowledge does not in all
cases render the accused immune
from being an accessory before the
fact. Thus, where this acquiescence
amounts to a negligent omission of
a legal duty, whereby death ensues,
there may be an indictment for mur-
der or manslaughter: People v.
Diamond (1902) 72 N. Y. App. Div.
281, 76 N. Y. S. 57, 175 N. Y. 517,
67 N. E. 1087; Adams v. Common-
wealth (1908) 129 Ky. 420; Powell
v. U. S. (1924) 2 Fed. (2d) 47;
Bishop, "Criminal Law" (8th ed.
1913) vol. I, sec. 314. But it is
emphatically asserted in these cases
that such legal duty must exist. A
casual spectator who fails to inter-
fere in the commission of a crime
would not thereby render himself a
party to that crime: Jones v. People
(1897) 166 Ill. 264, 46 N. E. 723.
On the other hand a conductor of
a train on which fifty gallons of
whiskey were transported in such
shape that he could not but have
known of its presence was con-
victed for knowingly transporting
liquor. The court said accused
should have seen, as jar as was
reasonably within his power that
the law was observed on his train:
Powell v. U. S., supra.
The meaning of the terms "aid"
and "abet" has become somewhat
confused in a maze of definitions:
Baumgarter v. State (1919) 20
Ariz. 157, 178 Pac. 30, 32; People
v. Barnes (1924) 311 Ill. 559, 143
N. E. 445, 447; Johnson v. State
(1926) 21 Ala. App. 565, 110 So.
55; State v. Baldwin (1927) 193 N.
C. 566, 137 S. E. 590, 591. It wohld
seem however that the surrounding
circumstances of each case, de-
termine whether or not the specific
acts or words constitute aiding and
abetting. Mere words alone, as in
the principal case, which incite and
encourago the commission of the
crime have been held to be sufficient
to make one an accessory before the
fact: Rasberry v. State (1917) 80
Tex. Crim. App. 498, 191 S. W. 356.
Or the defendant, though not actu-
ally doing the felonious act, by his
will contributing to, or procuring
it to be done: True v. Common-
wealth (1890) 90 Ky. 651, 14 S. W.
684. Or the defendant sharing the
criminal intent of the party com-
mitting the crime: Triple H. v.
Commonwealth (1925) 141 Va. 577,
127 S. E. 486.
In the principal case, defendant
was not only present, but by his
words incited the commission of the
crime. This was determined by the
verdict in the lower court which is
supported by a preponderance of
authority: Rasberry v. State, supra;
Wynn v. State (1885) 63 Miss. 260;
Creech v. Commonwealth (1908)
32 Ky. L. Rep. 808, 107 S. W. 212;
Rose v. State (1916) 79 Tex. Crim.
Rep. 413, 186 S. W. 202. That
judgment on this verdict was re-
versed in the instant case, because
the witnesses were not excluded
from the court before the state
opened its case to the jury, a mat-
ter which was entirely discretionary
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with that court seems to have been
a miscarriage of justice.
ALVIN R. KATZ.
FORMER JEOPARDY - DECLARATION
OF MISTRIAL - JuRoR ACQUAINTED
WITH FORMER ASSISTANT STATE'S
ATToRNFY -[Illinois] On a trial
for conspiracy to suborn perjury, a
juror was asked whether he knew
anyone in the State's attorney's of-
fice. He mentioned a former as-
sistant State's attorney, who en-
tered the court-room shortly after-
wards and spoke to one of the de-
fendants, while waving with his
hand to this juror. After the de-
fense counsel had said that he had
no objection, the court withdrew a
juror and declared a mistrial. On
writ of error to review the convic-
tion at the ensuing trial, counsel for
the plaintiff-in-error contended that
the defendant did not consent to
the withdrawal of the juror. Held:
that the judgment should be af-
firmed on the ground that there
was no error in the record requir-
ing a reversal; that the withdrawal
of the juror presented a case of
absolute necessity in which the dis-
cretion of the trial judge was con-
trolling: People v. Sinws (Ill. 1931)
178 N. E. 188.
The decision is in accord with
the general principle that the court
may discharge a jury without work-
ing an "acquittal" of the defendant
in any case where the ends of jus-
tice would otherwise be defeated,
although it is usually held that a
plea of former jeopardy will pre-
vail unless there is an absolute
necessity for the discharge to pre-
vent a miscarriage of justice: State
v. Thompson (1921) 58 Utah 291,
199 Pac. 161, note, 38 A. L. R. 697
(bystander commented to juror that
"such a prosecution is a shame";
not such an absolute necessity as to
defeat the plea of former jeop-
ardy); State v. Slorah (1919) 118
Me. 203, 106 Atl. 768, note, 4 A. L.
R. 1256 (defendant exclaimed, on a
view with the jury, "take me away
before I go insane again"; jury's
discharge was an absolute neces-
sity) ; Armor v. State (1906) 125
Ga. 3, 53 S. E. 815 (juror was
prosecutor's relative; absolute ne-
cessity); Simmons v. U. S. (1891)
142 U. S. 148, 12 Sup. Ct. 171 (jury
discharged because of juror's ac-
quaintance with the defendant);
People v. Diamond (1925) 231
Mich. 484, 204 N. W. 105 (juror
asked the defendant's daughter at
lunch whether they had a case);
State v. Bell (1879) 81 N. C. 591
(juror had helped the defendant
prepare his case); State v. Sueing
(1873) 42 Ind. 541 (giving jury a
can of beer did not necessitate their
discharge). Service of petit juror
on the grand jury which returned
the indictment may be an "absolute
necessity": People v. Peplos (1930)
340 IIl. 27, 172 N. E. 54; Martin
v. State (1923) 161 Ark. 423, 256
S. W. 367; Stewart v. State (1864)
15 Ohio St. 155; contra: O'Brian v.
Commonwealth (1872) 72 Ky. 333;
and see, Riley v. Commoinwealth
(1921) 190 Ky. 204, 227 S. W. 146.
The Illinois provision against
double jeopardy is: "No person
shall . . . be twice put in jeop-
ardy for the same offense": Con-
stitution of 1870, Art. II, sec. 10.
This defense may be shown under
the plea of not guilty: People v.
Peplos, supra; Hankins v. People
(1883) 106 Ill. 628; People v.
Hawkinson (1927) 324 Ill. 285, 155
N. E. 318; People v. Brady (1916)
272 Ill. 401, 112 N. E. 126. It is
usually considered that jeopardy
attaches when the jury is sworn:
Green v. State (1923) 147 Tenn.
299, 247 S. W. 84; O'Donnell v.
People (1906) 224 Ill. 218, 79 N.
E. 639 (jeopardy does not attach
when only four jurors are sworn);
McFadden v. Commonwealth (1854)
23 Pa. 12 (same for eleven) ; Lovato
v. N. M. (1916) 242 U. S. 199, 37
Sup. Ct. 107 (jeopardy does not
attach until the defendant pleads);
Huey v. State (1920) 88 Tex. Cr.
377, 227 S. W. 186; note, 12 A. L.
R. 1006.
Cases where the doctrine of abso-
lute necessity has been recognized
are those in which the defendant
consents: Riley v. Commonwealth,
supra; Martin v. State (1924) 163
Ark. 103, 259 S. W. 6, note 33 A.
L. R. 133 (the defendant's consent
was unnecessary when a juror had
served on former trial of same
case); Hilands -v. Commonwealth
(1885) 111 Pa. 1, 2 Atl. 70 (de-
fense of former jeopardy %,,as not
waived by the defendant's consent
to the jury's separation); Cornero
v. U. S. (C. C. A. 9th 1931) 48 F.
(2d) 69 (discharge of jury over
the defendant's objection sustains
plea of former jeopardy) ; either
the judge, a juror or the defendant
is sick or absent from court: People
ex rel. Brinkman v. Barr (1928) 248
N. Y. 126, 161 N. E. 444 (judge
sick) ; Salistean v. State (1927) 115
Neb. 838, 215 N. W. 107 (member
of juror'9 family was sick; former
jeopardy was no defense) ; State v.
Slorah, supra.
If the jury is unable to agree
after deliberating for a reasonable
time, their discharge may not
amount to an acquittal of the de-
fendant: U. S. v. Perez (1824) 22
U. S. 579; State v. Barnes (1909)
54 Wash. 493, 103 Pac. 792 (forty-
three hours); Dreyer v. People
(1900) 188 Ill. 40, 58 N. E. 620
(sixteen hours); contra: Bellis v.
State (1928) 157 Tenn. 177, 7 S.
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W. (2d) 46 (sixteen hours) ; Peo-
ple ex rel. Stabile v. Warden (1911)
202 N. Y. 138, 95 N. E. 279 (five
hours). A jury was discharged
after deliberating for five hours
because the term of court had
ended; a conviction of the defend-
ant at a subsequent trial was af-
firmed: Winsor v. The Queen
(1866) L. R. 1 Q. B. 289.
The majority of states have some
provision in regard to double jeop-
ardy, usually contained in the con-
stitution. As has been seen, some
confusion has arisen as to just
when jeopardy attaches. This ap-
plies, also, to the "same offense"
concept, which has been accelerated
to a certain extent by the litiga-
tion under the Federal and State
liquor legislation. In Ohio, a con-
viction for transporting liquor in
one county allows a plea of former
jeopardy to a prosecution in another
county for the same transaction as
it is a continuing offense: State v.
Shiminan (1930) 122 Ohio St. 522,
172 N. E. 367. But a person can
be punished for the same crime in
both Federal and State courts as
these are violations of two laws:
U. S. v. Cruikshank (1875) 92 U. S.
542; U. S. v. Lanza (1922) 260 U.
S. 366, 43 Sup. Ct. 141. The same
situation is applicable to violations
of State laws and municipal or-
dinances: State v. Cavett (1927)
172 Minn. 16, 214 N. W. 479.
An acquittal of larceny obtained
by false testimony does not allow
recognition of the defense of former
jeopardy in a prosecution for
perjury: People v. Niles (1921)
300 Ill. 458, 133 N. E. 252, note
37 A. L. R. 1284; People v. Mel-
nich (1916) 274 Ill. 616, 113 N. E.
971; People v. Ashbrook (1917)
276 Ill. 382, 114 N. E. 922; State
v. Cary (1902) 159 Ind. 504, 65 N.
E. 527; Teague v. Commonwealth
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(1916) 172 Ky. 665, 189 S. W. 908.
An acquittal of larceny does not
bar a prosecution for burglary
based on the same transaction:
Cambron v. State (1922) 191 Ind.
431, 133 N. E. 498, note 19 A. L.
R. 623; Gordon v. State (1882) 71
Ala. 315; People v. Devlin (1904)
143 Cal. 128, 76 Pac. 90,0; State v.
Hooker (1907) 145 N. C. 581, 59
S. E. 866. But where the verdict
on an information charging a
burglarious entry, was guilty of
larceny, there could be no further
prosecution for larceny or burglary:
State v. Burnes (1915) 263 Mo.
593, 173 S. W. 1070. Where one
indictment charged murder by shoot-
ing and the second one, murder by
striking with a gun there was no
double jeopardy as the offenses
charged are not the same: Guedel
v. People (1867) 43 Ill. 227. Two
injuries inflicted in the same
transaction are sometimes con-
sidered two different offenses: State
v. Labbee (1925) 134 Wash. 55,
234 Pac. 1049; People v. Majors
(1884) 65 Cal. 138, 2 Pac. 744.
The opposing view that a prosecu-
tion for one bars a prosecution for
the other has been maintained in
several cases, however: Gunter v.
State (1895) 111 Ala. 23, 20 Sou.
632; Clen v. State (1873) 42 Ind.
420; State v. Nelson (1849) 29 Me.
329; Griffith v. State (1915) 93
Ohio St. 294, 112 N. E. 1017; State
v. Cooper (1833) 13 N. J. L. 361
(conviction of arson barred prose-
cution for murder); Smith v. State
(1929) 159 Tenn. 674, 21 S.W. (2d)
400 (conviction of manslaughter
barred prosecution for assault and
battery but not for driving an auto-
mobile while intoxicated) ; see
Wright v. State (1897) 37 Tex. Cr.
627, 40 S. W. 491 (acquittal of one
crime does not bar prosecution for
another although a conviction
might).
Into this array of decisions comes
the American Law Institute's pro-
posed restatement relating to double
jeopardy. It states ihat at common
law the doctrine was that an accused
person had not been in jeopardy
until the jury had rendered a vei-
dict of either guilty or not guilty on
the crime in question. A jury's dis-
charge prior to such action was no
bar to a subsequent prosecution.
The basis for this view goes back to
a statement by Lord Coke in which
he says that after a jury has been
impaneled it 'should not be dis-
charged until a verdict is rendered:
Co. Litt. 227 b; Coke: Third In-
stitute 110; Hale P. C. 267. To
argue the other way, a passage from
the Doctor and Student, Dial. 2, cap.
52 and Hale P. C. 244 may be cited:
Reg. v. Charieswortl (Q. B. 1861)
1 B. & S. 460, 10I E. C. L. 459;
contra: Reg. v. W'Vardle (1842) Car.
& M. 647.
The problem of the "same of-
fense" is attacked in the American
Law Institute's work by the test of
the violation of the criminal law
in connection with the similarity of
the fact situation. It states that a
jury may be discharged only when
it is impossible to proceed without
injustice. The provision that a
conviction unreversed or an ac-
quittal in one state bars a prosecu-
tion for the violation of the same
part of the criminal law in another-
state or under the flaws of the
United States is, perhaps, more salu-
tary than the decisions cited supra.
Other clauses contain the following
stipulations: where acquittals are
obtained by technicalities such as
errors in the indictment there may
be a subsequent prosecution; a state
is entitled to a new trial if the de-
fendant has been acquitted and there
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is a material error which would
prejudice the state; when an ac-
quittal or conviction of a person
is obtained by some fraud or col-
lusion on his part, it shall be no
bar to another prosecution for the
same offense; a verdict which is so
imperfect as to render judgment
on it impossible does not bar an-
other trial; if a new trial is
awarded, this does not constitute a
second prosecution for the same
offense; all pleas of double jeop-
ardy, such as former acquittal, or
conviction are abolished and the
defenses are allowed to be shown
under a motion to quash the indict-
ment or information.
The preliminary draft of the
American Law Institute on this sub-
ject should do much to relieve the
confusion which, at present, sur-
rounds the problem. That such re-
vision was required, may be readily
perceived by no more than a super-
ficial survey of the cases such as
has been attempted here. If the
provisions are given proper recog-
nition, they should tend to eliminate
some of the difficulty which is as-
sociated with the idea of double
jeopardy, now.
J. F. WATERMAN.
